Our national motto is e pluribus unum ("from many, one"). Whenever Democrats support policies that weaken the integrity and identity of the collective (such as multiculturalism, bilingualism, and immigration), they show that they care more about pluribus than unum.Of course, there is much more to his piece than this singular observation; his treatment of political ideology and moral psychology is particularly cogent. Agree with his conclusions and treatment of the problem or no, he offers valuable insight that is, at the very least, worthy of consideration.
To my mind, Haidt's work compliments Richard Weaver's observation in Ethics of Rhetoric (1962) that in discursive practice conservatives tend to argue from definition and liberals tend to argue from circumstance, providing yet another locus for understanding the dynamic between language, thought, and action.
If you are at all interested in rhetoric, politics, and ideology, you should check it out.
5 comments:
But as a rhet/comp person, you must realize the logical fallacy at the heart of the selection you quoted from-- assuming that the reader agrees that multiculturalism, bilingualism, or allowing foreigners to enter our country somehow "weaken[s] the integrity and identity of the collective" is a classic example of begging the question. In fact, some of us not only disagree with that assumption, we find that very notion absurd.
Another thought...
I'm only halfway through the article, but it seems to me that the author makes some rather cogent points about a certain type of "do-gooder liberalism." But it seems to me that the article would be even better if he considered post-colonial literary theory as well as the work of cultural anthropologists like Dwight Conquergood (maybe he does later, but I wanted to get these ideas posted to this comment section quickly, lest you read my first dismissal of the begging the question be read as a dismissal of the entire article).
It seems to me that the major hurdle that Americans in general need to get over is the sense that "I know what's right for everyone." Whether it's a Republican who feels that gay marriage is an abomination or a liberal atheist smugly dismissing all references to spirituality as stupidity, the philosophical impulse remains the same-- force others to behave the way I believe that they should and sublimate an existing culture with my own-- imperialism, in other words. This is even more apparent in our attitudes towards other cultures-- while some parts of the world treat, say, women, in ways that we find oppressive or abusive, we don't do anybody any favors by trying to enforce our notions of modernity on others through violence or threats; all that breeds is resentment, hostility, and-- most often-- violent resistance.
There are limits to this idea of tolerance, though-- those faith healing parents from a few years ago who suspended their son's radiation therapy for Hodgkin's Disease in favor of just "praying on it"? They belong in jail. But these weren't people from another culture trying to hold onto their sacred beliefs who need to be convinced of the benefits of western medicine-- these were dolts from our culture who had no excuse for their ignorance.
If you haven't read Anne Fadiman's The Spirit Catches You and You Fall Down, I highly recommend it as an example of how western liberal assumptions and traditional values and beliefs can collide with tragic results.
Ah, but I think you miss what Haidt is attempting to engage here: this quote is not an appeal, nor does it reflect his position (quite the contrary, I dare say), nor does it advance a claim. It reports a phenomenon observed in his data, collected by asking participants to self-select into groups according to a survey of their moral values or presuppositions. His articulation of this particular point does not beg the question because it is not situated in a way to make an appeal--he is not asking the reader to assume anything, but is reporting a phenomenon that he seeks to better understand.
His argument (or at least one part of it) is that at the heart of partisanship lies fundamental differences in moral psychology, differences that are often ignored or rendered 'absurd' through reductive or dismissive means . . . and therein lies the folly: to dismiss rather than engage.
In essence, Haidt, to my mind, is attempting to assume an alternate ethos in order to visit a problem from a different, perhaps contrary, perspective. In this example, if one identifies 'the collective' in terms of a particular definition of 'United States citizen,' as clearly some of his participants have, then the selection from which I quoted represents his ventriloquism of those views; it represents an argument, indeed an entire discursive movement, that shares a particular moral stance. Situated thus, this statement reports a moral phenomenon, one that is treated as real by its members, that informs ideology but does not advance a fallacious claim. It is only when these discourses collide that one may assess the validity of the claim, but as a position that informs ideology it makes no such rhetorical move.
Perhaps I would have been better to quote the following from the concluding paragraph of his piece:
"The three Durkhimian foundations of ingroup, authority, and purity are powerful tools in [the struggle for unity]. Until Democrats understand this point, they will be vulnerable to the seductive but false belief that Americans vote for Republicans primarily because they have been duped into doing so."
I daresay Republicans would do well to replicate the same cross-ethos engagement.
Finally, what I find so intriguing about Haidt's work is that he demonstrates the kind of temperance, especially intellectual temperance, for which I consistently advocate.
It seems we are writing on top of each other! As to your second set of comments,
"It seems to me that the major hurdle that Americans in general need to get over is the sense that 'I know what's right for everyone.'"
And I agree . . . but the problems come not from our (say, national)objectives, but consensus about how to best reach them. This is where I argue definition/structure then circumstance/application. A framework in which to assess the situation and act accordingly. I suspect you may disagree . . .
You also wrote,
"There are limits to this idea of tolerance, though-- those faith healing parents from a few years ago who suspended their son's radiation therapy for Hodgkin's Disease in favor of just "praying on it"? They belong in jail. But these weren't people from another culture trying to hold onto their sacred beliefs who need to be convinced of the benefits of western medicine-- these were dolts from our culture who had no excuse for their ignorance."
Here, I agree with you---but lacking a sense of fluid, multifaceted unity (as opposed to fragmented relativism) by what metric can we define what is outside the parameters of the reasonable, fair, and just?
By the way, these are all just ideas I am working through and are not necessarily firm positions I've adopted. It is, in many ways, and argument to myself as much as to the 'other,' so I greatly appreciate your willingness to wind through the topic with me.
Oh, and thanks for the recommendation of Fadiman's work. I'll be sure to check it out.
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